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Captive Supplies and the
Cash Market Price:
A Spatial Markets Approach
Mingxia Zhang and Richard J. Sexton
Exclusive contracts (often called "captive supplies") between processors and farmers
are an increasingly important feature of modern agriculture. We study an interesting
empirical  regularity  occurring  in  markets  that  feature  both  contract  and  spot
exchange: the spot price is inversely related to the incidence  of contract use in the
market. We use a spatial model and a noncooperative game approach to show that
processors can use exclusive contracts to manipulate the spot price in certain situa-
tions. Captive  supplies in these settings represent geographic buffers that reduce
competition among processors. However, in markets where the spatial dimension is
less important,  captive supplies are ineffective  as barriers to competition because
firms have incentive to "jump" across a captive supply region  to procure the farm
product.
Key words: captive supplies, duopsony, exclusive contracts, FOB price, meat packing,
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Introduction
Exclusive contracts (often called "captive supplies") between processors and farmers are
an increasingly important feature  of modern agriculture.1 These contracts often cause
concern among producers and their advocates. A number of markets feature both spot
transactions and contracts, and a key worry is that captive supplies might be used as
a tool to depress the spot market  price  and reduce producer  profits.  This  issue has
attracted particular attention in the cattle sector where several empirical studies have
documented an inverse relationship between the spot market price and the incidence
of exclusive contracts in a region.2 This empirical regularity represents something of a
puzzle.  Analyses to date have  emphasized that the relationship  may not be causal.
For example, Ward et al.  suggest the relationship  may be a result of packers' and
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Frank and Henderson, and Henderson report estimated shares offarm-processor output marketed through vertical inte-
gration and various  forms of contract production for major U.S. food industries. To gauge  the growth in vertical control in
U.S. agriculture, these estimates can be compared to those reported for  1960 and 1970 by Mighell and Hoofnagle.
2 Studies that have documented an inverse relationship between the cash market price and magnitude of deliveries from
captive supplies include Elam; Schroeder et al.; and Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder. Captive supply deliveries  had an ambig-
uous effect on the cash price in a study by Hayenga and O'Brien. Preliminary analysis of data from an ongoing USDA study
of cattle procurement in the Texas  Panhandle  region also indicates  an inverse relationship  between the  cash price  and
packers' use of captive supplies. (Because this study is in progress, USDA is holding the details of the analysis in confidence.)Captive  Supplies and the Cash  Market Price  89
feeders' inventory management activities. In this study, we employ spatial modeling to
show that processors can use captive supply contracts strategically to influence the cash
market price in some market settings.
Concern that captive supply contracts were being used to the detriment of farmers
was one factor that motivated Congress to order the U.S. Department of Agriculture to
study  rising  concentration  in the  red  meat  packing  industry  (USDA/Agricultural
Marketing  Service).  A current USDA investigation  focuses  specifically  on fed cattle
procurement practices in the Texas Panhandle region.  The impact of captive  supplies
in the  livestock  sector  has  considerable  policy  relevance  because  the  Secretary  of
Agriculture is authorized under the Packers and Stockyards Act to ensure competition
and fair trade practices in these industries, a mandate that exceeds the government's
authority to intervene generally in markets under the antitrust laws.
Ward, Koontz,  and Schroeder characterize the effect of captive  supplies on the spot
market in terms ofleftward shifts in both supply and demand, noting correctly that the
net effect on price is ambiguous and depends upon the functional forms of demand and
supply. However,  the competitive markets paradigm underlying this type of analysis
may not be appropriate in many agricultural product procurement markets, including
livestock. Indeed, the competitive impacts of rising concentration in meatpacking have
been the focus of several recent studies of the industry, including the aforementioned
USDA investigation (see Azzam and Anderson for a survey of this literature).
Azzam, and Love and Burton have studied some economic aspects of captive supplies
in beef packiing using models that do allow for imperfect competition. Following Perry's
1978 work, Love and Burton use a model of a dominant packing firm with a competitive
fringe to show that the dominant firm has incentive  to integrate  upstream into cattle
feeding to reduce efficiency losses caused by its exploitation of monopsony power. The
open-market price is affected as a consequence of this behavior, but price may rise or fall
depending upon how integration affects the residual elasticity of raw product  supply.
Azzam does not offer an explicit motivation for exclusive contracts.  Rather, he uses an
equilibrium displacement model of an industry to derive an expression for the elasticity
of the open-market price with respect to the degree of processor upstream integration.
Again, the sign  of this expression  is  ambiguous,  and Azzam  argues that a negative
relationship between the open-market price and packer integration may not be a conse-
quence of packer market power.
Our  study is quite distinct from the prior work.3 We develop  a model of duopsony
within a spatial markets framework  to show that exclusive contracts  can  be used in
some market settings to diminish competition between buyers, and hence represent a
device  to  enhance  oligopsony  coordination.  Thus  the  motivation  for  captive  supply
contracts in our model is to influence the cash market price. The implications for compe-
tition policy are, accordingly, quite different from the prior analyses.4
3 Most prior research on exclusive or "captive" contracts  in the general  economics literature has emphasized their use by
monopoly firms as a possible deterrent to entry. Recent contributions to this literature include Aghion and Bolton; Rasmusen,
Ramseyer,  and Wiley; Innes and Sexton; and Stefanadis.
4By focusing on the use of captive supply contracts as a means to influence the spot market price, we do not mean to sug-
gest that other factors, such as those discussed by Ward et al. and by Love and Burton, are unimportant in packers' decisions
whether to offer such contracts.  However,  even if captive supply arrangements  are implemented  primarily for some other
reason, our analysis  shows that their presence may have the effect of reducing the spot market price.
Zhang and SextonJournal  ofAgricultural and  Resource Economics
The Basic Model
Space  is important in many agricultural  raw product markets  due  to bulkiness  and
perishability, and hence high costs of transporting the farm product.  For purposes of
exposition, we develop the spatial model in the context of cattle feeders selling fed cattle
to beef packing plants, although the analysis applies  generally to any farm product
market characterized  by few buyers,  spatially  dispersed  production,  and  relatively
expensive transportation.
Consider two  beef packers,  A and B, located  at the end points of a line  with unit
length. Cattle producers are located continuously along the line with uniform density
D =  1.5 Each producer has an identical supply function of the form q(w(r)) = w(r), where
q is production of fed cattle, r is the producer's distance from the processor, and w(r) is
the net price the producer receives  at the farm gate.6 A beef packer converts q into a
finished product (e.g., boxed beef), g, according to a fixed proportions production func-
tion, g = min{q/,  h(Z)}, where Z is a vector of processing inputs, and X = q/gis the fixed
conversion factor between raw and processed product. Without further loss of  generality,
2A  can be  set equal to  1.0 through choice of measurement units, and hence q =  g. The
processing cost function associated with the production function is C(q) = m(q)q + c(q),
where m(q) is the inverse supply function facing the processing firm, and c(q) is the cost
associated  with  the processing  inputs  Z.  It  will  be  convenient  to assume  constant
marginal processing costs, and thus c(q) = cq. Further, we assume that processors are
perfect competitors in the sale of the finished product and take output price,p, as given.7
We define  p =p - c as the finished product price net of per unit processing costs. We
further set p = 1 via a normalization,  so all monetary variables are measured in units
of p.
The  cost of transporting a unit of livestock to a processing facility is s per unit of
distance. We assume an FOB or mill pricing arrangement in which packers offer a plant
gate price and cattle feeders are responsible  for all costs of shipping their livestock to
the processing plant. The most common alternative to FOB pricing is uniform delivered
(UD) pricing wherein the processor offers the same net price to all producers and bears
nominally  all  shipping  costs.  The  method  of pricing  used  in practice  is  often  not
transparent. For  example, in the beef industry  it  is  rather  common  for packers  to
arrange for transportation, suggesting a UD pricing arrangement. However, packers
also usually bid a unique price at each feedlot, so it is quite conceivable that packers
adjust their bids in consideration of shipping costs, causing the pricing arrangement to
be FOB. We focus here on FOB pricing because the analysis is much simpler than for
5 This basic model formulation is rather standard in the literature on spatial economics (see Greenhut, Norman, and Hung
for a general overview).
6 This assumption implies that farm supply intersects the origin, and thus is unitary elastic everywhere. Although this
assumption  comes at some cost in terms of generality, it markedly simplifies the exposition.  (See Zhang and Sexton for
further discussion.)
7This assumption is consistent with the notion that raw product markets are local or regional in geographic scope, whereas
processed product markets are often national or international. Hence, competition in processed food products will often
be more intense than competition for the raw product inputs (Rogers and Sexton). This view of the beef packing industry
is generally consistent with empirical studies of market power in the industry as summarized by Azzam and Anderson.
However, Hayenga, Koontz, and Schroeder argue, based  on a variety of empirical tests, that regional cattle prices  are
closely interrelated and that "analyses  of concentration in beef packing need to focus  on relatively broad geographic
markets."
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UD pricing.8 The basic economic motivations at work in our analysis are present under
either pricing arrangement.
Zhang and Sexton show the relative importance  of space in a duopsony market is
determined by the ratio of the per unit transportation cost multiplied by the distance
separating processing firms (the spatial dimension) to the net value (p)  of the finished
product (the economic dimension). Given the normalizations employed here, this ratio
is simply s. Given this model structure,  s measures the intrinsic competitiveness  of
the market.  For example, if s > 4/3, shipping costs are sufficiently high that the firms'
desired market areas do not overlap under either FOB or UD pricing, and each acts as
an isolated monopsonist.9 As s -0, the market converges to a nonspatial duopsony where,
under price-setting behavior, the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium involves both firms paying
a farm price m = p = 1, i.e., the perfectly competitive price. Therefore, the continuum of
values for s C  [0, 4/3] depicts the entire range of competitive outcomes from perfect com-
petition to pure monopsony.
We first examine the determinants of the duopsony FOB prices when there are no
captive supplies.  This  equilibrium provides  the benchmark to which equilibria  with
captive supplies will be compared. We then use multistage noncooperative game models
to analyze processors' decisions to offer captive supply contracts and producers' decisions
to accept or reject those contracts. The most general model would involve processors
deciding first on the geographic areas in which to offer captive supply contracts and then
competing in price for the captive supply customers. Finally, processors would compete
in the spot market to procure  supply not committed  through captive  contracts.  Our
experience suggests that this model in full generality is not tractable. Thus, we focus on
two simplified versions of the more general model. The first version is an asymmetric
model in which firm A offers captive supply contracts but firm B does not. In the second
version, both firms may offer captive supply contracts, and therefore compete in both the
contract and spot markets.
Results for these two models are rather similar and quite intuitive. If space, as meas-
ured by s, is sufficiently important in a market, processors can use captive supplies, in
effect, to create a geographic buffer between themselves which diminishes their subse-
quent competition in the spot market. In these  settings, captive  supplies represent a
way to influence the spot market. However, if space is not important (s is small), captive
supply regions do not represent an effective barrier to competition because processors
have incentives to "jump"  across the region of captive supplies and compete to procure
product on both sides of the captive supply area.
Duopsony Price Competition
Without Captive Supplies
Firms A and B offer mill prices  mA and mB, respectively, at their factory gates and pro-
ducers are responsible  for the shipping cost. A producer  located at distance r from a
8  The key problem in a duopoly or duopsony model with UD pricing is that an equilibrium in pure strategies generally does
not exist, forcing use of complicated mixed strategies (see Zhang and Sexton for further discussion).
9  For example,  an FOB-pricing firm that is a pure monopsonist-and thus is free to choose both purchase price (m) and
market area (R
m)-will set m = 2/3 and serve market radius R
m= 2/3s (Zhang). Hence, for s > 4/3, firm A's and firm B's market
areas do not overlap, and each can act as a pure monopsonist. A similar result holds for the UD pricing case.
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plant receives a net price  w(r) =  m - sr. When s 2 4/3, each firm operates as an isolated
monopsonist,  sets the monopsony price  m~ = mB =2/3, and serves market radius 2/3s
(Zhang). When s < 4/3, the firms face competition from each other. In this case, the mar-
ket boundary (RA)  between A and B is determined by the condition:
(1)  mA  - sRA  = mB  - S(  - RA).
This condition can be rewritten as:
mA  - mB  + s
(1')  RA  2s
2s
The duopsony market is illustrated in figure  1.
The respective  profit functions for firms A and B are:
(2)  A  (1  m-  A) RA (mA  - sr)dr
(1  - mA)(
3 mA  + mB  - s)(mA  - mB  + s)
8s
and
(3)  B  =(1 - mB)  RA  (mB  - sr)dr
(1  - mB)(
3 mB  + mA  - s)(mB  - mA  +  s)
8s
The first-order conditions to maximize 11A with respect to mA, and 
1iB with respect to mB,
can be solved to obtain firm A's and firm B's price reaction functions. Solving the two
reaction functions simultaneously, we obtain the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium FOB prices
without captive  supplies as follows:
O(4)  m  o  ()=  mo(s)  = mo(S ) =  1  - 1.5s  + i1  -s  + 3.25s 2
(4)  m  ((s) - m  (s)  - ms(s)  2
where the subscript "0" denotes the FOB price solution without captive supplies. Each
firm serves half the market (RA  = 1/2) in this equilibrium.
The equilibrium price in this model, mo(s), is illustrated in figure 2 and is the out-
come  of two  offsetting factors.  One  factor is the price  a firm would pay if it  were a
monopsonist operating with a market radius that is fixed at R =  1/2  due, e.g.,  to some
geographic  barrier. This price,  labeled mm(s), is also illustrated in figure 2, and is an
increasing function of s because the firm rationally absorbs part of the increased ship-
ping costs represented by higher values of s.10 The second factor is the effect of compe-
tition on price. Larger s diminishes competition between the firms, promoting a lower
10  The reason a spatial monopsonist absorbs part of an increase in his/her suppliers' shipping costs is fundamentally the
same as the reason why a monopolist passes only a portion of a cost increase forward to consumers. In either case, the firm
accepts a lower profit per unit but maximizes total profits by selling (monopoly) or buying (monopsony) more than if none of
the cost increase were absorbed.
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Figure 1.  Duopsony FOB price competition without
captive supplies
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farm price. As figure 2 illustrates, this competition effect dominates over the interval
s e  [0,  0.9533),  so that ms(s) is decreasing in s. Eventually, however, ms(s) reaches  a
minimum at s  - 0.9533, and then begins to rise as the cost absorption effect dominates
until mo*(s) = 2/3, the monopsony price, for all s 2 4/3.
A Two-Stage  Game Approach
to Captive Supplies
We now introduce the possibility of packers offering captive  supply contracts  in this
market. The objective is to derive market equilibria in the presence  of captive supplies
and compare them to the equilibrium without captive supplies derived in the prior sec-
tion. We study a two-stage model of captive supplies where firm A uses captive supplies
but firm B  does not. This outcome might emerge, for example, in a market where one
firm acts as a leader and unilaterally offers captive supply contracts.11
In stage  1,  firm A chooses  R~,  the left boundary  to its captive  supply  region. We
assume the right boundary is fixed at 0.5, the geographic midpoint of the market, so the
captive supply region, denoted as d,,  is  [Rc, 0.5].12  Figure 3 illustrates the model. We
assume that firm A's contract is of the form mC = max{mA, mB}. In other words, firm A
offers to pay potential captive supply customers the maximum of its price or firm B's
price in the cash market.13 A producer offered a captive supply contract in stage 1 must
decide whether to ACCEPT the offer or REJECT it, where rejection implies that the
producer elects to sell in the spot market.
In stage 2, firms A and B decide on spot market prices mA and mB to maximize their
profits, taking as given any captive  supply contracts signed in stage  1. The sequential
structure of the game corresponds with the way captive supplies are used in reality-
namely, the captive  supply  contracts  are always  arranged  prior to any transactions
occurring in the spot market. We focus  on markets  where  s <  4/3, i.e., markets that
feature active duopsony competition in the absence of captive  supply contracts.14 We
solve the two-stage game by backward induction, beginning first with the solution to the
stage 2 price-setting subgame.
Solution to Stage 2
In stage 2, A and B set prices mA and mB, taking as given the captive supply region, if
any, established in stage  1. In seeking a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium to this subgame,
1 This asymmetry in the use of captive supplies is consistent with actual practice in beef packing. Some processors procure
the majority share of their supply through various forms of exclusive dealings, while other packers in the same geographic
area make very little use of captive  supplies (Ward et al.).
12 The assumption that the right boundary of the captive supply region occurs at the market midpoint is made solely to
simplify the exposition.  Given the form of captive supply contract used in the model, the equilibrium location of the right
boundary would be the market midpoint if it were determined endogenously.
13This simple contract design is compatible with many of the marketing agreement contracts used in cattle procurement.
These contracts often use a base price that is pegged to the price in the spot market during the delivery week. Actual con-
tracts  also specify  premiums and discounts based on quality considerations,  a factor that is not present in this model. Our
goal is to show that exclusive contracts can be used to influence  the spot market price and, accordingly,  we do not worry
especially about designing a contract that is in some sense "optimal" from a packer's perspective.  The form of the contract
specified here facilitates  analysis of a producer's choice whether to accept or reject the contract.
14 The incentives to offer captive  supply contracts that we demonstrate in this study for duopsony also apply to the monop-
sony case.
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Figure 3.  An asymmetric model of captive supplies
two possibilities are evident: (a) both firms can operate exclusively within the boundary
created by the captive supply region  ([0,  0.5 - dc)  for firm A and (0.5, 1] for firm B), or
(b) either firm can elect to "jump" across the boundary and attempt to procure product
in the region of the rival firm's location. We first establish that such boundary-jumping
behavior cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium set of pure price strategies.
*  LEMMA 1. For  any captive supply region ofpositive measure (i.e., d, > 0), prices that
enable either  firm to jump across  the boundary created  by the captive supply region
cannot constitute a pure strategy  Nash equilibrium  to the stage 2 subgame.
Proof of the lemma relies upon the observation that location in the presence of costly
transportation gives either firm a natural advantage in procuring supply from its "half"
of the market.  Given a value (m  ) for mA, if it is profitable for firm  B to offer a price
sufficiently above mi  that some producers located in the region [0,  0.5 - d^)  are willing
to incur the higher costs of shipping product to B, then it is necessarily profitable for A
to offer a higher price  than m'  so as to retain those producers.  A similar argument
applies  to possible boundary-jumping behavior  by firm A. Thus, any price pair that
results in boundary jumping by either firm cannot be part  of a pure  strategy Nash
equilibrium.
We focus, therefore, on strategies that involve each firm procuring supply from only
those producers located on its side of the captive supply region. Specifically, we derive
the simple monopsony  optimum for each firm and then determine the values for s for
which  these  prices  are robust to  potential boundary-jumping  strategies.  The firms'
respective profit functions as monopsonists in their spot market areas are:
(5)  In -c 0  =  (1-mA)  cf 05 d(m  - sr)dr
Jo
(1-  mA)
(0.5  - d,)(2mA  - 0.5s  + sdd)
2
and
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(6)  II  B  =  (1  - mB)  f
0
5(  - sr)dr =  (mB  - 0.25s).
(m  - 0.25s).
From the first-order conditions,  we obtain optimal prices for firms A and B:
1  s  sdc (7)  m(d  )  +  - _
AC  2  8  4
and
1  s
(8)  mi(s)  + .
2  8
Thus in stage 2,  mB 2 mA. Notice in particular that mA is a decreasing  function of the
magnitude  (do) of A's captive  supply  region because  A's monopsony  spot price  is an
increasing function of the spot market area that A serves. The reason is that, as the spot
market area increases, the average shipping costs incurred by A's customers rise. Firm
A rationally absorbs a portion of these costs in setting mA.
The firms' profits from their respective  noncaptive supply regions are:
(9)  II;(dC,s)  =  (1  - 2dc)[4  - s(l - 2d  )]2
128
and
(10)  II;(s)  =  (4  -s) 2.
128
Solution to Stage 1
Firm A's total profit (II)  from both the noncaptive supply area and the captive supply
area is specified as:
(11)  IIj  =  I;  +  cap
= (1  - m*) f  5-c (m  - sr)dr + (1  - m,)  f 5 (mc  - sr)dr,
J0  o.5-dC
where  m4 is firm A's optimal mill  price  from  stage  2  as specified  in  (7),  and mc  =
max{ mA,  m* }  = m*.
15The first term on the right-hand side is A's profit from spot market
transactions, and the second term is profit from captive supplies. Substituting  mA and
m~ into (11) yields:
(11')  I  1 (d,  s)  =  (1  - 2d,)(4 - s  + 2sd,)2 + - (4  - s)(4  - 3s + 4sd,).
128  64
Maximizing (11') with respect to dc yields the following solution:
15 Note (as figure  3 illustrates) that our equilibrium prices  are vulnerable  to producer arbitrage in the region near the
contract market boundary, Rc.  Producers to the immediate  left of R,  have incentive to ship  product to R, and attempt to
procure the contract price m>  m.  We do not concern ourselves witharbith  rage because the contracts can be readily designed
to surmount it. For example, discriminatory contracts can be used to reduce the contract price nearRc, or the contracts could
be written to limit each producer's  supply to q  = q(m  ).
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(12)  dc  =
3
Thus in stage 1, firm A offers captive supply contracts to the farmers located on the line
between 1/6 and 1/2. This result does not depend on s. Given dj = 1/3, the firms' respec-
tive optimal mill prices in stage 2 are:
(13)  mA(s)  1 +  - and  mB(s)=  +  -.
2  24  2  8
Firm A therefore offers the captive supply contract  mc = max{mA,  mB } = mB to producers
in the interval [1/6, 1/2]. Will producers in the captive supply area ACCEPT or REJECT
the contracts? Given the form of the contract, these producers receive a price at least as
high as those who sell in the spot market, and we assume that a producer who is indif-
ferent will agree to sign the contract. However,  rational producers  must consider the
effect of their actions on the market equilibrium. In other words, will a producer agree
to sign the contract knowing that the aggregate effect of captive supply contracts is to
depress the cash market price and make all producers, including him/herself, worse off
than if none signed the contract?
Rasmusen,  Ramseyer,  and Wiley  (RRW)  answer this question affirmatively in an
analysis of exclusionary contracts designed to deter entry into a monopoly market. The
logic they develop  to show that rational  agents will sign exclusive  contracts that are
mutually detrimental also applies here. In our proposed equilibrium, producers in the
contract area receive mc = max{mA,  mB } =  m  . If no exclusive contracts were signed, from
(4) these producers would receive  mO  > m.  Thus, if  thte producers in the captive supply
region were able to coordinate their actions, they could benefit by mutually refusing to
sign the captive  supply contracts.  RRW demonstrate  it  is precisely  this inability  to
coordinate that enables the excluding firm to secure the customers' acceptance of the
contracts. In particular, note that firm A could pay the captive supply customers mo +  e
if necessary (where e is a small "signing bonus"), and still benefit from offering captive
supply contracts because of the lower price it is able to pay its spot market customers
as a consequence. Hence, any producer in the proposed captive supply region knows firm
A  can  guarantee  acceptance  of its captive  supply  contracts  by  offering mo + e, and
therefore that the captive  supply arrangement  will succeed.  Unilateral refusal  by a
producer to accept his/her contract cannot affect the ultimate success of the arrangement.
Thus, as long as the producer is offered at least as much as could be received in the spot
market in the equilibrium with captive supplies, the producer's equilibrium strategy is
to ACCEPT  the contract.16 In essence,  the knowledge  that firm A has the economic
incentive to implement a captive supply region enables A to secure captive supply
contracts at a minimal cost.
Based on the above,  the candidate  subgame perfect  equilibrium  to this two-stage
game  involves  firm A offering  captive  supply  contracts  in the region  [1/6,  1/2],  and
producers  in that region  accepting  the captive  supply  contract  that offers  m,  =
max{ mt,  m  }. The equilibrium stage 2 spot market prices in (13) represent the monop-
sony solutions given the captive supply region set in place in stage  1.  The remaining
6  This argument applies regardless of whether producers  decide sequentially or simultaneously on acceptance or rejection
(RRW).
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task is to investigate the set of s values, if any, for which this solution is sustainable.
Specifically, we need to determine the values of  s for which the stage 2 monopsony prices
do not invite "boundary jumping" wherein at least one of the firms competes to procure
product on both sides of the captive supply area. We must check sequentially whether,
given m*,  firm B  wants to set a  price to  enable  it  to procure  product in the region
[0,  1/6),  and,  given m  , whether firm A wants  to set price to procure  product in the
region (1/2,  1].
Given mj = 0.5 + s/24, we check first whether it is profitable for firm B to jump to firm
A's spot market area. Let II  denote B's profit from pursuing a boundary-jumping strat-
egy. B's problem is to choose  mB to maximize  IIH:
(14)  max{m B} IB  = (1  -m)  f  (mB - sr)dr + (1  -mB) fRA (mB  sr)dr,
where
mA  - mB  + s  1  25  mB
R A =  +___
2s  4s  48  2s
given mA  = 0.5 + s/24. The solution to (14)  is:
(15)  mj  _32 +6s  + /592  - 600s  - 459s 2
B  (15)  mB  -72
and  IIB* = II(mB(s)) represents the maximized profit from boundary jumping.
Because  B can pursue either the boundary-jumping or the monopsony strategy, we
express B's overall profit as:
(16)  In ° -max  {;(s), IIB*(s)},
where II(s)  is defined in (10) and represents the maximum profit from pursuing the
monopsony strategy.  Comparing the two maximized  profits reveals that B prefers to
jump across the captive supply boundary and procure product in the region [0,  1/6) for
s < 0.2367.
We next check  firm A's incentive  to jump  to B's area given mn  = 0.5 + s/8. Let lA-
denote firm A's profit from boundary jumping. A's problem under a boundary-jumping
strategy is to choose mA to maximize IIA:
(17)  max {mA}  HI  =  (  1  - mA)  R  (mA  - sr)  dr,
where
mAmB  - m  - 0.5  + 0.875s
RA  =  .MA  =-
2s  2s
given  mB  = 1/2 + s/8. Notice that for firm A to procure supply from the region (0.5, 1] in
the spot market, A must set its price above m  . Thus, A's price in the contract market
is mc  =  max{mA,  m  } = mA,  and A's  contract  and  spot price  are  identical,  leading  to
equation (17). The solution to the problem in (17) is:
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Figure 4.  Firm A's profit under monopsony and boundary-
jumping strategies
(18)  mj(s)  =  32  - 14s  + V637s2 - 392s  + 592
72
and IIA* =  II(mA(s)) represents the maximized profits from boundary jumping.
Because A can pursue either the boundary-jumping or the monopsony strategy, we
express A's overall profit as:
(19)  ln  = max{  nJ(d,  s),  I*()},
where  IIj(dc, s) is found by substituting dc  = 1/3 into (11'), and represents the maximum
profit from pursuing the monopsony  strategy.  Comparing the two maximized profits
reveals (as illustrated in figure  4) that A prefers a boundary-jumping  strategy, given
mB, whenever  s  < 0.8665.  The intuition  in either boundary-jumping  case  is that a
captive supply region represents an ineffective barrier to competition when s is small
because firms are readily able and willing to procure product across a large geographic
area.
Thus, the solution for dc,  mA,  and mB  given in (12) and (13) is robust to boundary-
jumping strategies by either firm for s > 0.8665, and therefore this solution represents
a subgame perfect equilibrium within this range of space. As figure 5 illustrates, both
firms A and B offer a lower price in the spot market than the duopsony price without
captive supplies. Both firms make at least as much profit in this captive supply setting
as in the duopsony setting without captive supplies (as illustrated in figure 6). Thus, in
markets where space is of sufficient importance (s 2 0.8665 in our model), processors can
use selective captive  supply contracts to diminish the spot market price and increase
profits at producers' expense.
For s < 0.8665, boundary jumping defeats an attempt to implement the monopsony
solution given in (12) and (13). However, the boundary-jumping prices given in (15) and
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Figure 6.  Differences between profits under captive
supplies and duopsony
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(18) do not themselves represent Nash equilibrium strategies. Rather, they respectively
represent  price strategies that B and A would choose  in response to the rival firm's
monopsony spot prices given in (13) for the indicated ranges of s. The monopsony price
in (13) is not optimal if it is vulnerable to boundary-jumping strategies, i.e., the combin-
ation of the monopsony price for firm i and a boundary-jumping price for firmj do not
constitute a Nash equilibrium to the stage 2 pricing game.
The problem is that the firms' profit functions, as expressed in (19) for A and (16) for
B, are discontinuous  in mA  and mB, respectively,  for values  of s that invite boundary
jumping at the monopsony  prices.  In general,  discontinuity in a player's  payoff as a
function of the player's choice variable causes a problem of nonexistence of equilibrium
in pure strategies. An equilibrium in mixed strategies does exist, however (Dasgupta
and Maskin). In contrast to a pure price strategy, which is expressed in terms of a rule
such as (13) for choosing price,  a mixed strategy is expressed in terms of a probability
distribution function for price, i.e., a probability rule for choosing mA. We do not attempt
to characterize  the mixed-strategy equilibria here.
A Three-Stage Game Model of Captive Supplies
In the preceding model, a leader firm moved unilaterally to offer captive supply con-
tracts. It  will also be interesting to consider a model where the firms compete both in
the contract market and in the cash market. Thus, in this section we consider a model
where both firms may offer captive supply contracts. In stage 1, the firms decide on the
market area in which to offer captive supply contracts. We assume this region [k,  1 - k ]
is symmetric around the midpoint of the market. In stage 2, the firms compete to offer
captive supply contracts in this region.  The market boundary between firms A and B
in the captive supply region is found where the firms' net contract prices are equal:
RA  = (mAC  - mBC +  s)/2s. In stage 3, firms A and B, respectively,  offer monopsony spot
prices for farmers in the intervals  [0, k) and (1 - k,  1] that are not served  by captive
supply contracts. Figure 7 illustrates the market setup.
Solution to Stage 3
As in the previous  model, we find the motopsony solution in the spot market regions
and then determine whether this solution is sustainable against any boundary-jumping
strategies. The respective  firms' profit functions in the noncaptive  supply areas are as
follows:
(20)  II  = (1  - mA )  k (mA - sr)dr = k (1  - mA)(2mA  - sk)
f v ~o  2
and
(21)  U=  (1  - mB)  (m  - sr)dr = k-(1  - mB)(2mB  - sk).
2
Profit maximization yields the following monopsony solutions for the spot market price:
(22)  mA(S)  = mB(S)  = 1  + sk
(22)  m (s)  = mi(s)  -
2  4
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Figure 7.  A symmetric model of captive supplies
Notice again that the larger the captive supply region (i.e., the smaller is k), the lower
the resulting spot market price. As the spot market region increases, each firm ration-
ally  increases  its  monopsony  price  to partially  absorb the  higher costs  of shipping
incurred by more distant producers.
Solution to Stage 2
The firms compete in prices  mAC  and  mBC to procure captive supply contracts, taking as
given the contract market area  [k,  1-  k]. The respective firms' profits from offering
captive  supplies are as follows:
(23)  AP  =  (1  - mA) 
A (mAC  - sr)dr
and
(24)  P  = (1  - mB)  RA  (mBC  - sr)dr,
where  RA = (mAc - mBC +  s)/2s. Maximizing  (23) and (24) with respect to  mAC  and mBC,
respectively,  yields the reaction functions that can be solved to yield the Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium contract prices to stage 2:
(25)  mc(s,  k)  =  m(s, k)
1  - 1.5s  +  +  4sk  +  - s  + 3.25s2  + 12s2k(k  - 1)
2
The captive supply contract prices (mC =  mBC) are  determined identically to the pure
duopsony price  (ms  ) obtained in (4), except that competition for captive supplies occurs
in the restricted area [k,  1 -k] rather than over the entire market [0,  1].  For example,
when k = 0, equations (4) and (25) are equivalent. The competition for captive supplies
is,  accordingly,  more intense  and the contract prices are higher than both the pure
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Figure 8.  Optimal captive supply prices and boundary
duopsony price and the spot market contract price for all k > 0 (see figure 8). Hence, it
follows immediately that all producers offered captive supply contracts in stage  2 will
choose to ACCEPT the offer.
Solution to Stage 1
In stage  1, we  assume firm A chooses  the lower boundary (kA)  of the captive supply
region, and firm B chooses the upper boundary (1 - kB).17Each firm makes this decision
to maximize its total profit from both the noncaptive and the captive areas, taking into
account the ensuing competition in stages 2 and 3. Because the firms are  symmetric,
we set kA  = kB = k, and focus  on firm A's  choice. A's stage  1 optimization problem is as
follows:
(26)  max{k}  IA  = II  + IA
(1  - mA ) k (m  - sr)dr + (1  - mA)  RA (mA  - sr)dr
k  (2 - m)sk) 2 m) k-_(2-  sk)2 +  M AC (1  - 2k)(4m  -s  - 2sk),
16  8
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where m*  and mAc are given in (22) and (25), respectively. The first term in (26) is profit
from the spot market,  and the second term is profit from captive supplies.
The intuition is that by setting k E (0,  0.5), A creates a dual market. In the captive
supply region [k,  1 - k], firms A and B  compete in price to sign producers  to captive
supply contracts. As noted, the contract prices in (25) are higher than the pure duopsony
prices in (4). This fact, however, does not necessarily  mean that profits in the captive
supply region are less than profits in that region under the pure duopsony solution. The
reason is that, if the buyer could price discriminate, he/she would prefer to offer higher
prices  to  more  distant producers  to  compensate  partially  for their higher  shipping
costs. For large values  of s, the duopsony price in (4) is less than the price that would
maximize  profits considering only the producers  in the captive  supply region [k,  0.5].
Thus,  the  higher  contract  price  and the  higher  production  it induces  can actually
increase  profits from serving  those producers  relative to what is earned under pure
duopsony.
Use of captive supplies also reduces  competition in the spot market areas  [0, k) and
(1  -k,  1]. Either firm earns more profit in the spot market areas by offering the mon-
opsony price in (22) than it earns by offering the duopsony price in (4). However,  the
monopsony  price is not an equilibrium for all values  of s, because for small s it is not
sustainable in the face of boundary-jumping strategies. However, the boundary-jumping
strategies themselves cannot constitute Nash equilibria, because lemma 1 applies to this
model as well.
We used simulation methods  to solve (26) to find  k*(s), the optimal captive supply
boundary, given the stage 3 monopsony prices in (22) and the stage 2 contract prices
in (25).  We then must determine for each value of s, using analysis similar to that
employed for the asymmetric model, whether the candidate strategies (k *,  mA* = mB, and
mA  = mBC for k, mA, mB, mAC,  and mBC) are sustainable against boundary-jumping strat-
egies by either firm. Because the firms are symmetric in this model, we need check only
firm A's incentive to engage in boundary jumping given k*(s),  =  and m.  Firm
A's profit-maximization  problem under a boundary-jumping  strategy is:
(27)  max{mA} IA  = 11 ap + (1  - mA) [  (mA -sr)dr + fA(mA -sr)dr
[Jo  Ji-k
where
mA - mB + s  mA-  0.5 + s(l - 0.25k)
RA  -
2s  2s
The solution to (27) is:
mA(s I*)  =
2(12s +  8 - 31sk*) +  144s2 -240s  - 1,896s2k* + 148 + 284sk* + 3,853s2k * 2
36
and II*  = II(mA) represents the maximized profits from boundary jumping.
We express A's overall profit as:
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Figure 9.  Differences  in  processor profits under captive
supplies and pure duopsony
Comparison of llA and II`*  indicates that firm A will set a spot price that enables it to
jump  to B's market  area, given  k* and mB = 1/2 + sk*/4, when s < 0.893. Therefore, the
solutions for m~ = ms,  mA  =  m,  from (22) and (25), and k*, as illustrated in figure 8,
apply only for s > 0.893. Again, when  space is less important in the sense of small s,
captive supplies represent an ineffective barrier to competition.
Figure 8 illustrates the solution for the sustainable range of s, including the captive
supply boundary  k *,  monopsony spot price, captive supply price, and, for comparison, the
pure duopsony price for values of s in this region. When firms compete to offer captive
supply contracts, each offers the contracts over a smaller geographic area than when a
leader firm unilaterally offers such contracts. Figure 9 shows the differences between
a firm's profit and the duopsony profit in the intervals  [0, k *), [k *, 0.5], and in total when
the firms offer captive supply contracts in the range s e [0.893,  4/3]. The firms always
gain in the spot market region and in total from offering captive  supplies. The profit
differential from the spot market decreases when s increases. Firms lose in the captive
supply region compared to pure duopsony for smaller values of s, but when s > 1.088,
firms also gain in the captive supply region.
Implications for Empirical Analysis
Several  implications from the models developed  in this study are testable, given the
appropriate  data sets. If captive supply contracts are being used to influence the cash
price,  the  model  predicts  that,  ceteris  paribus,  those  feedlots  with  captive  supply
contracts  will be located at greater distances from the packer than their cash market
suppliers  (i.e., the captive  supply area provides  a boundary around the cash market
Zhang and Sexton
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area).  The model also predicts that the producer price in the captive  supply contracts
must be at least as high as the cash market price, holding other factors such as quality
constant. Further, the model posits that captive supply contracts will be more prevalent
in the more concentrated procurement areas because they are rendered ineffective by
boundary jumping in markets  when competition  (as measured  by s in our  model) is
sufficiently intense.
In principle, an encompassing empirical analysis could treat a packing plant's share
of throughput  from  captive  supply  contracts  as  a  limited  dependent  variable,  and
express it as a function of several explanatory variables chosen to test the importance
of the factors discussed here versus other possibilities discussed by Love and Burton;
Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder;  and others. Key explanatory variables suggested by this
analysis include measures of the competition faced by the plant, including number of
direct competitors and distance separating competitors.
Due to concerns about rising concentration and vertical control in the livestock sector,
USDA's Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) has used its
authority  under the  Packers  and  Stockyards  Act  to  generate detailed  data sets  on
packer-feeder  transactions.  The most comprehensive of the GIPSA data sets involved
collecting transaction records for 43 packing plants over a period of roughly one year,
from April  1992 to April  1993.18 This and similar GIPSA transactions-level  data sets
might be used to test implications  of the models presented here.
Concluding Comments
Our spatial models show that processors may be able to use captive supply contracts to
influence the cash market price to producers'  detriment. This result is consistent with
a stylized  fact from the cattle  industry that the cash  price in a  region is negatively
correlated with the use of captive supply arrangements in the region. This conclusion
is important because  prior studies  of this phenomenon have  tended to emphasize
explanations that do not involve market manipulation.  We  do not suggest that our
model represents a definitive explanation for the use of captive supply contracts in farm
product markets. Indeed, such contracts may be motivated by any of several efficiency
considerations,  including obtaining assured supplies, reducing the distortions  due to
processor monopsony power (Love and Burton), and addressing problems of adverse
selection  or moral hazard among producers. 19 Nonetheless,  even  if captive  supply
contracts  are implemented  for some other reason, this analysis has  shown that their
presence may influence the cash market price to producers' detriment.
However,  our demonstration that captive  supplies can  be used in a manipulative
fashion in a concentrated spatial market does emphasize that it is important for policy
makers to evaluate the expanding use of captive  supply arrangements in agriculture
with  a critical  eye.  The stylized  models presented  here  emphasize  that bases  for
concern are greatest  in markets that feature high buyer concentration  and shipping
costs that are high relative to the net value of the finished product. In these settings,
18 Ward et al.,  and Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder  have discussed and analyzed this data set.
19 See Katz for a general discussion of these issues, and Antonovitz, Buhr, and Liu for applications to meat packing.
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captive supply regions form an effective spatial barrier between firms, enabling each to
act as a monopsonist in the spot market area near its respective location and earn more
profits than would be attainable from transacting solely in the spot market.
[Received June 1999;  final revision received November 1999.]
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